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HOW LIBERATED WAS JUDGE
JEROME FRANK?t
Michael E. Smith*
A MAN'S REACH: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE JEROME FRANK.

Edited by Barbara Frank Kristein. Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press. 1977. (Reprint of the edition published by Macmillan, New York, in 1965). Pp. xxvii, 450. $26.
Professor Edmond Cahn's introduction to this volume provides a handy biographical sketch of Jerome Frank.
Born in New York in 1889, he practiced law in Chicago and New
York for a number of years, created a sensation in 1930 when he
published the controversial Law and the Modern Mind, became
one of the most creative figures in President Roosevelt's New Deal,
held important posts in the AAA and SEC, and in 1941 became a
judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
where he served until his death in 1957. Meanwhile, besides lecturing at Yale Law School and writing several books, the most
important of which was Courts on Trial (1949), Judge Frank
played a ubiquitous role as leader in libertarian and humanitarian
causes. [P. ix]

The first judicial opinion by Frank I ever saw was in the
contracts casebook I used as a first-year law student.' The case
concerned nothing more lively than the enforcement of arbitration agreements, but I can still remember my surprise and delight
when I encountered the extract. It had a strong intellectual appeal compounded of broad learning, wit, sharp insights, and cogency. Moreover, the extract displayed an iconoclasm calculated
to please the cocky tyro. Not only was Frank sharply critical of
past doctrine; he proposed that judges had been hyperrationalistic, incoherent, venal, and extremely foolish. All of this
made me an instant Jerome Frank fan.
Frank's nonjudicial writings, especially Law and the Modern Mind and Courts on Trial, will probably continue to be read
widely by students of law. His judicial opinions, on the other
hand, like those of nearly all judges, will become increasingly
obsolete and perhaps finally vanish from notice; in the later edit Copyright ©Michael E. Smith 1979. Part of the work on this Review was done with
support from the William Nelson Cromwell Foundation to whom I express my gratitude.
• Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.A. 1956, Haverford Collel(e;
M.A. 1963, Harvard University; J.D. 1964, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir.
1942), reprinted in J. DAWSON & w. HARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS AND
CONTRACT REMEDIES 267-68 (1959).
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tions of that contracts casebook, for example, all reference to
Frank's opinion on arbitration has been removed. As time passes,
fewer and fewer students and lawyers with tastes similar to mine
will experience the surprise and delight of encountering their first
of many Frank opinions.
The reprinting of A Man's Reach, which includes twenty of
Frank's opinions as well as extensive extracts from his nonjudicial writings, is therefore very welcome. It will help to introduce the opinions, albeit in an expensive format, to future generations of readers in law. Here I want to describe for those unfamiliar with Frank as a judge the pleasures that may await them in
this volume and also to point out certain characteristics of
Frank's judicial work that may not be so obvious.
Most of the opinions in this book are well chosen to convey
the qualities I first enjoyed in Frank's work; that is to say, most
are highly discursive. The only disadvantage in this selection is
that readers may be misled about Frank's ordinary output. ·Many
of his opinions, especially later in his career, were quite traditional in content and style, and some were even terse. These are
perhaps best represented in this volume by United States ex rel.
Leyra v. Denno and United States v. Field.
The editor has wisely included some of Frank's opinions on
subjects of popular interest. The appendix to United States v.
Roth has Frank's famous discourse on the constitutionality of
obscenity laws. His opinion affirming the convictions and death
sentences of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for espionage is here.
Baseball fans can read Frank's views on an antitrust suit brought
by ballplayers blacklisted for having jumped to the Mexican
League after World War II. Those curious about Frank's position
in causes celebres will also want to see his concurring opinion in
United States v. Sacher, 2 affirming the contempt penalties imposed on the defense lawyers following the trial of the top Communist leaders under the Smith Act; unfortunately the opinion
is omitted from this volume.
My main difficulty with the selection of cases is the repetition of subject matter. All but four of the twenty cases concern
civil or criminal procedure, arid four of these are mainly about the
problem of "harmless error."3 Readers may benefit from this in
certain ways. The repetition enables Frank's points to sink in
2. 182 F.2d 416, 453-63 (2d Cir. 1950).
3. That is, when an appellate court thinks an error was committed at trial, it must
then determine whether the error was harmful enough to necessitate a retrial. See 28
u.s.c. § 2111 (1976); FED. R. CIV. P. 61; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.
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more deeply, in accord with one of his favorite canons of persuasion (see p. xxvii). The subjects are accessible to nonexperts.
They gave rise to the sharpest disagreements between Frank and
his colleagues on the Second Circuit, which provides an element
of dialogue to the cases. The selection also connects the opinions
with the extracts from Frank's nonjudicial writing, which mostly
concern fact-finding by courts. Still, readers may find the repetition somewhat tedious and yearn for a richer mixture of cases.
From the many Frank opinions on other subjects that are discursive and relatively comprehensible. I have selected an even dozen,
well-known within the profession, which I recommend to those
wishing to explore Frank's judicial work further. 4
The book has a general introduction by Professor Edmond
Cahn and a preface by Justice Douglas, both close friends of
Frank. These provide biographical information and personal portraits helpful to the reader's understanding of Frank's temperament. Neither says much that is useful about his judicial work;
indeed, Cahn's analysis of Frank as a "paragon of trimmers" (p.
xii) strikes me as misleading.5 There are also brief case introductions by the editor, Frank's daughter.
Readers will find the editing of the cases generally unobstrusive. Occasionally, crucial facts are omitted from both Frank's
opinions and the short introductions. Relying solely on this book,
it is impossible, for example, to appraise the claim of judicial
unfairness in United States v. Rosenberg (pp. 294-96) or the argu4. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 974-82 (2d Cir. 1948) (dissenting opinion) (desirability of trade-name protection); Repouille v. United States, 165
F.2d 152,154-55 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion) ("good moral character" for naturalization); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (summary judgment); Ricketts v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-70 (2d Cir. 1946) (concurring opinion) (releases of
liability by injured workmen); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37-43 (2d
Cir. 1945) (desirability of trade-name protection); Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc,
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943) (consumer rights in the administrative process);
Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942) (hearsay evidence); Picard v. United
States Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 638-45 (2d Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion) (desirability
of the patent system); Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1942)
(judicial attitudes toward administrative agencies); Kulukundis Shipping Co, v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942) (judicial attitudes toward arbitration); M.
Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 954-69 (2d Cir. 1942) (dissenting
opinion) (freedom of contract); Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc,, 121 F.2d 336 (2d
Cir. 1941) (releases of liability by injured workmen).
5. In this context, trimmers in part are those who "lsetl themselves in extreme
opposition to the majority of their time and [seek! to counterpoise the majority's exaggerations and distortions" (p. xi). Compare Cahn's analysis with my comments below, text
at notes 18-21 infra, about Frank's stance in Communist-related cases and his penchant
for overargument.
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ment that the judge's charge in United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co. cured the prosecutor's misconduct {p. 326). The omission of cited cases, and sometimes of entire passages of case analysis, most notably in Antonelli Fireworks, makes it more difficult
to evaluate Frank's handling of precedent. The entire first section
of Frank's dissent in Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp. has also
been excluded, depriving the reader of some particularly sharp
insights into Frank's judi~ial approach. Finally, the omission of
most footnotes diminishes the impression that the opinions give
of Frank's extraordinarily wide interests and reading. Yet these
are relatively small obstacles to the reader's enjoyment and stimulation.6
As I mentioned at the start, one potential source of enjoyment in Frank's judicial work is its intellectual character. First,
in dealing with legal questions Frank was apt to resort to an
interesting variety of nonlegal materials. The famous appendix
to United States v. Roth displays this trait vividly. There, in
discussing the constitutionality of obscenity laws, Frank drew
heavily on historical and sociological data concerning such matters as the literary tastes of the framers, Victorian sexual mores,
the effect of pornography on adults and children, and pornography in classical literature. He also quoted the speculations of
Milton, J.S. Mill, Macaulay, Goethe, Carl Becker, Franklin
Roosevelt, Spinoza, and Jimmy Walker, and even resorted to his
private correspondence with a psychologist.
The opinions in this volume are also full of clever asides,
legal and nonlegal. Some are merely witty, others are trenchant;
for me they are the best things in the opinions. Here is a sample.
Responding to the "apparent paradox" that the first amendment,
in the name of the democratic process, may invalidate the fruits
of that process: "The paradox is unreal: The Amendment ensures
that public opinion . . . shall not commit suicide through legislation which chokes off today the free expression of minority views
which may become the majority public opinion of tomorrow" {p.
135) (emphasis in original). Speaking of the power of juries to
decide according to their own views of the law: "[M]ost writers
on jurisprudence . . . would do well to modify their ideas by
recognizing what might be called 'juriesprudence'" (p. 262). Acknowledging psychological arguments against special jury ver6. Connoisseurs of the opinions of notable judges may wish to compare THE ART AND
CRAIT OF JUDGING: THE DECISIONS OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND (H. Shanks ed. 1968), now
regrettably out of print. The selection and editing of the opinions are excellent, and so
are the extensive commentaries.
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diets: "Seperation [sic] of a decision into 'law' and 'fact' components . . . [may] be 'too logical,' in the sense that it excludes
that 'intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up
many unnamed and tangled impressions, impressions which may
lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth'" (p. 269).
"[T]o the question whether the difference between a difference
of kind and difference of degree is itself a difference of degree, the
sage answer has been given that it is a difference of degree, but a
'violent' one" (p. 314). "[T]he judge's cautionary instruction
may do more harm than good: It may emphasize the jury's awareness of the censured remark-as in the story by Mark Twain of
the boy told to stand in the corner and not think of a white
elephant" (p. 333). Denouncing the "one-word-one-meaning" fallacy: "Similar reasoning would compel the conclusion that a
clotheshorse is an animal of the equine species, and make it impossible to speak of drinking a toast" (p. 425).
Most notable of all, many of the opinions printed here contain long, cogent essays on a variety of legal topics; often these
are only remotely related to the cases. One of the most widely
known is Frank's compelling discourse on special jury verdicts in
Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. There he pointed out,
among other things, the declining status of juries in other democratic countries; the scope that general verdicts gave to jury lawlessness and prejudice; the grave difficulties in reviewing general
verdicts; the assistance to accurate fact-finding given by special
verdict forms; the inability of juries to grasp legal instructions,
and the consequent folly of overturning verdicts because of faulty
instructions; and the opportunity afforded by special verdicts for
dispensing with most instructions. Admittedly, Frank did not
consider the objections to some of these contentions, nor did he
discuss any of the practical problems in using special verdicts; yet
he did carefully canvass opposing considerations based on the
psychology of making decisions. I think readers will find the discourse most impressive.
Although I have emphasized the idiosyncratic aspects of
Frank's opinions, since they evidence most clearly his intellectual
powers, Frank could also perform traditional legal exercises effectively. Here are some examples from the book. His capacity for
sensitive observation and presentation of factual detail is shown
in two confession cases (pp. 342-43, 369-70) and in his analysis of
the testimony of an eavesdropping policeman (pp. 360-61). Legally trained readers will enjoy Frank's deft handling of precedent
in distinguishing an old Supreme Court ruling that organized
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baseball is not subject to the Sherman Act (pp. 313-14) and in
demolishing an opponent's authorities in United States u. Field
(pp. 397-401). A judge~s capacity for sharp analysis is well-tested
by lurking choice of law questions, a test Frank passed with high
honors in United States u. Forness (p. 430). Finally, his opinions
concerning harmless error, especially United States u.
Rubenstein and United States u. Antonelli Fireworks Co., demonstrate Frank's ability to construct a persuasive doctrinal argument. Somewhat spruced up, it ran as follows: Appellate courts
have no opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses as a
guide to their credibility. Therefore, in the ordinary case they are
in a poor position to assess the strength of the evidence on either
side. That means, in turn, that they can hardly gauge accurately
the iikelihood that the verdict would have been the same even if
errors at trial had not been committed. We have a constitutional
policy of allowing juries to decide uncertain questions of fact,
especially in criminal cases. Moreover, since they see the witnesses they are better placed than appellate courts to find the
facts accurately. Therefore, in any case of significant doubt about
the harmfulness of an error, the matter should be sent back for
retrial. This argument, although not conclusive, is at least very
powerful.
Readers may also delight in Frank's iconoclasm, his propensity to thumb his nose at traditional legal ways. The main target
of this iconoclasm was the commitment of lawyers and judges to
general rules and binding precedents. At his mildest, Frank contended that the commitment was greatly exaggerated. In Aero
Spark Plug Co. u. B.G. Corp., for example, he argued at length
that judges were too preoccupied with the pi:ecedential implications of their own decisions; they ought to concern themselves
mainly with a just disposition of the cases before them. Correspondingly, judges should be much more willing to disregard undesirable precedents laid down by others (pp. 444 ff.). 7 Frank
acted on the latter view in a number of cases in this volume,
including Gardella u. Chandler, United States u. St. Pierre, and
United States v. Forness.
More drastic was Frank's belief that rules and precedents
could not possibly be of much real significance because of their
inherent indeterminacy. For this view readers must refer mainly
to the extract from Law and the Modern Mind, published ten
7. See also United States v. Forness (pp. 429-30).
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years before he became a judge, but it is echoed in at least one
case here in which Frank wrote,
The conventions of judicial opinion-writing-the uncolloquial
vocabulary, the use of phrases carrying with them an air of finality,
the parade of precedents, the display of seemingly rigorous logic
bedecked with "therefores" and "must-be-trues"-give an impression of certainty (which often hypnotizes the opinion-writer) concealing the uncertainties inherent in the judging process. On close
examination, our legal concepts often resemble the necks of the
flamingos in Alice in Wonderland which failed to remain sufficiently rigid to be used effectively as mallets by the croquet players. [Pp. 323-24]

Frank also believed that rules and precedents were of minor
importance because they were overridden by other aspects of the
legal process. 8 Like other legal realists, he avowed that "[a] legal
system is not what it says, but what it does" (p. 336), and for
him the largest determinant of what it does was procedural (p.
367). Moreover, in his view our fact-finding procedures were
badly flawed; beyond unavoidable sources of error, such as the
fallibility of witnesses, he felt that we deliberately impeded accurate fact-finding. Thus Frank repeatedly denounced: total reliance on the parties to adduce the facts, especially when one party
was too poor to do the job properly (pp. 440-41); rules of evidence
whereby relevant information was excluded (p. 393); decision by
juries, "casually selected groups of twelve persons, most of them
untrained in the difficult art of fact-finding" (p. 338); myths
about the impartiality of judges (p. 411); and other generally
accepted features of our trial process. This so-called factskepticism is by far the most common form of Frank's iconoclasm
to find expression in his opinions.
Frank's iconoclastic appeal extends also to his opinionwriting style. In part this is a product of the intellectual characteristics already mentioned-the extensive use of nonlegal materials, the witticisms and trenchant asides, the lengthy essays.
Even more refreshing for readers impatient with the decorum of
judicial discourse will be Frank's propensity to needle his adversaries, including judicial colleagues. In United States v. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., for example, he accused the majority of suppressing crucial facts {pp. 325, 327), of preferring "the pocketbook of
8. I recognize Frank's express denial that he thought legal rules of"little importance"
(p. 196), and I argue later, text following note 10 infra, that in practice he seemed to take
rules seriously, but I still think that my statement accurately describes the genera'!
tendency of his polemics.
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an insurance company" to the liberty of an innocent criminal
defendant (p. 334), and of merely pretending to deplore prosecutorial misconduct, "recalling the bitter tear shed by the Walrus
as he ate the oysters" (p. 335). Frank did not spare any of his
colleagues from such strictures, not even Judge Learned Hand,
although it is likely that over the years his adversary, Judge
Charles Clark, received Frank's hardest blows.
To certain readers Frank's opinions will have yet another
ground of appeal, linked to the last, and that is their liberal
activism. Nearly everyone who writes about Frank comments on
his strong sympathy for the poor and powerless, and this is borne
out by the cases reproduced here. He denounced cowardly censorship only of the "relatively inconspicuous" (p. 129), monopolistic
conspiracies of employers against working people (p. 312), callous
exploitation of Indians (pp. 431-34), and use of invalid patents to
bully small competitors (p. 448). His strongest sympathies, however, were for criminal defendants. In case after case readers will
find him abhorring the possibility that innocent people may be
convicted-by false confessions wrongly extorted (pp. 364-65,
371-73), by prosecutorial misconduct (pp. 336-37), by improper
comments of judge to jury (pp. 421-22), by the confusions of a
mass trial (p. 408), and the like .. With almost equal fervor he
deplored the mistreatment of criminal suspects, for example, by
oppressive interrogation (pp. 364-65, 371-73), invasion of privacy
(pp. 357-58), or unwarranted subjection to trial (pp. 363-64).
Frank's viewpoint in criminal cases is especially notable because
it was shared only to a limited extent by Judge Learned Hand and
hardly at all by the other judges on the Second Circuit, not even
Judge Clark, a strong liberal in almost every other respect.
Frank could express these liberal commitments most effectively. One example from United States v. Rubenstein, concerning the erroneous conviction of the innocent, should suffice.
In a case like this, all our complicated judicial apparatus yields but
a human judgment, not at all sure to be correct, affecting the life
of another human being. If we are at all imaginative, we will comprehend what that judgment will mean to him, and what a horror
it will be if we wrongly decide against him. To be sure, one can say
that it does not pay to take too seriously the possibility that one
man, more or less, may be unjustly imprisoned, considering the
fact that [in World War II] millions have died and that the Atomic Age . . . may end any minute in the destruction of all this
planet's inhabitants. Yet (perhaps because I am growing old or
because, despite my years, I have not fully matured) it seems to
me that, if America's part in the war was meaningful and if man-
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kind's development has any significance against the background of
eternity, then the dignity of each individual man is not an empty
phrase. If it is not, then we judges, part of a human arrangement
called government, should proceed with great caution when we
determine whether a man is to be forcibly deprived of his liberty.
[P. 324]

There is also substantial reason for readers to conclude that
Frank was a judicial activist, which is to say that in deciding
cases he put his social commitments ahead oflegalistic considerations. This is strongly suggested by his overt avowals. He repeatedly suggested that the main task of judges was to do justice in
particular case_s (e.g., pp. 444-46). Moreover, he was prepared to
translate this liberal platitude into specific doctrine. For example, in Gardella u. Chandler he stated that, because the reserve
clause was so repulsive, judges ought to do their best to distinguish the Supreme Court ruling that organized baseball was outside the Sherman Act {p. 312). And in United States u. Forness
he expressly declined to apply established landlord-tenant law in
large part by characterizing the dispute as one between poor Indians and exploitative whites {p. 429).
The decisive test of activism, however, is results. Judged by
the cases in this hook, Frank passed the test easily. In all but
three, his "bottom line" (whether affirmed or reversed) was in
accord with his liberal social preferences. Two of the remaining
three cases involved communism, a matter to which I will return,
and the third opinion, United States u. Roth, was a dissent from
the criminal conviction in all but name. Moreover, it is my impression that the cases in this book are representative of Frank's
output as a whole. Compared to the other members of the Second
Circuit, most of whom were moderate to liberal, Frank voted far
more frequently in favor of criminal defendants and accused infringers of ·monopolies, and as a champion of personal injury
plaintiffs only Judge Clark was his equal.
Frank adhered to his social commitments even when they
conflicted with his views on fact-finding. In Skidmore u. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, he upheld a personal injury plaintiff
at the expense of a request for a special verdict; in Keller u.
Brooklyn Bus Corp., he did so by insisting on a technically perfect
jury instruction. In at least two other cases here, he invoked rules
that excluded relevant evidence in order to reverse criminal convictions. 9
9. United States v. Rubenstein (pp. 318-24); United States v. On Lee (pp, 352,61);
United States v. St. Pierre (pp. 383-94).
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Thus far I have addressed potential readers who may be inclined to admire Frank's traits as a judge and opinion-writer.
Others are apt to react differently. As in the past, some may find
his parade of learning vain, his asides silly, his extended discourses tedious, his attacks on others nasty. Frank's realism and
liberalism inay strike some as exaggerated or shallow; his activism may seem inappropriate in a judge. I do not recommend this
book to thoroughgoing traditionalists.
And yet, upon closer examination both iconoclastic liberals
and traditionalists may find Frank to be other than };ie seems. By
the realist criterion that he, himself, avowed-"[a] legal system
is not what it says, but what it does" (p. 336)-he was a fairly.
conventional judge.
Consider first Frank's avowed skepticism of legal rules and
precedents; throughout this volume readers will nevertheless see
him treating them seriously. He based his entire concurr~nce in
United States v. Roth on his own restatement of the law of free
speech (pp. 113-14). He attacked general verdicts in part because
they made it easy for juries to ignore rules oflaw (pp. 261-62). He
proposed carefully crafted doctrines for such subjects as harmless
error (p. 328) and the waiver of fifth amendment rights (p. 384).
He sought to root deeply in precedent his views on these matters
and others such as prosecutorial misconduct, electronic eavesdropping, and inaccurate jury instructions (e.g., pp. 331-32, 397403, 414-15). In one case he attacked a majority view largely, he
said, because it "may have wide precedential consequences" (p.
397).
Indeed, at times Frank put exaggerated reliance on rules and
precedents. A common fallacy of the formalists, whom realists
such as Frank attacked, was to move from authoritative general
propositions to a resolution of specific questions with hardly any
steps in between. Frank, himself, did this repeatedly. He applied
Supreme Court denunciations of trial practices such as prosecutorial misconduct or erroneous jury instructions without any comparison of the facts of the cases (pp. 326, 414-15). To Congress he
mechanically attributed policies he favored or opposed (pp. 317,
430-31). Most striking was his seeming deference to the fifth
amendment privilege and the sixth and seventh amendment
guarantees of jury trial. Frank claimed to oppose trial by jury,
especially in civil cases, as subversive of accurate fact-finding,
and at least at the start of his judicial career he also questioned
the use of privileges to exclude relevant evidence. Yet repeatedly
he asserted that these policy considerations were totally overrid-
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den by the very words of the Constitution, and thus he purported
to solve such refined problems as formulation of the harmless
error test and the precise point at which a witness waives his fifth
amendment privilege (e.g., pp. 323, 391-93). Incidentally, it
might be thought that Frank's treatment of these cases, though
wooden, was highly principled. In each instance, however, the
outcome Frank urged was to uphold a criminal defendant or a
personal injury plaintiff.
Readers may suppose that these excursions into traditional,
even formalist, methods of opinion-writing were merely attempts
to win assent from the less iconoclastic. If so, they were inconsistent with Frank's usual tactlessness, exemplified by his sharp
attacks on conventional judges and lawyers. They were also at
war with his avowed devotion to honest dealing between the
government and its citizens (p. 405). I think at least equally likely
is Professor Karl Llewellyn's suggestion that professionally
Frank had two authentic personalities; in jurisprudential polemics he was a provocative radical, but as a man of affairs he
was an orthodox (and able) practitioner. 10 I would add to this
observation my comments below concerning Frank's penchant
for overargument, which would have led him to exaggerate both
his theoretical rule-skepticism and his practical reliance on rules
and precedents. It is also relevant that Frank's most extreme
rule-skepticism dated from a decade before he became a judge.
In the interim the social situation had changed and Frank had
taken on a variety of practical responsibilities; by the end of that
decade he was more interested in other causes.
Frank's liberalism, too, was not as thoroughgoing as it may
seem. As I mentioned before, two of the three cases in this book
in which Frank voted against his usual social preferences involved
communism-the prosecution of the Rosenbergs for espionage
and the contempt conviction of Dashiell Hammett and two others, sureties for four Communist leaders who jumped bail. And
in Frank's most renowned case not in this book, United States v.
Sacher, 11 he voted, over the dissent of Judge Clark, to uphold the
contempt convictions of the defense lawyers at the Smith Act
trial of the top Communist party officers. None of the cases in
the book in which Frank followed his usual social proclivities
concerned Communists. On purely quantitative grounds readers
may have reason to conclude that Frank was considerably less
10. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRAomoN 220 n.214, 511 (1960).
11. 182 F.2d 416, 453-63 (2d Cir. 1950).
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liberal than usual in criminal cases involving communism. 12
This conclusion, however, has to be tested by doctrinal analysis. Of the Communist-related cases on which Frank sat, probably the most significant for civil liberties was United States v.
Rosenberg. Not only were there arguable claims that the trial had
been unfair, but it ended in the unprecedented imposition by a
civil court of the death penalty for espionage. Moreover, the case
attracted widespread public attention and was appealed amidst
a rising storm of anticommunism. The decision could not help
but have a significant impact on the public understanding of the
rule of law and the role of the courts in protecting that regime.
The customary appraisal of Frank's conduct in the
Rosenberg case is that it fit his liberal activism. He alone of the
appellate judges voted to reverse the conviction of Morton So bell,
the lesser defendant, and he did so for characteristic reasons. As
for the Rosenbergs, it is said that he honestly, and reasonably,
believed that they had received a fair trial. Still, in his majority
opinion he conscientiously discussed each of their numerous
claims at length. The death penalty he abhorred, so his admirers
claim, and he would have reversed it if there had been any legal
ground to do so, but he was foreclosed by irorrclad Supreme Court
precedents. He did what he could for the liberal cause, neverthe.:
less, by including in his opinion a powerful appeal to the Supreme
Court to reconsider the precedents that bound him {pp. xv, 290).
There is much to be said for this view, but there are grounds
to object to it as well. Regarding the_ fairness of the trial, two of
the Rosenbergs' claims were calculated to appeal strongly to
Frank's concern about conviction of the innocent. They argued,
with reason, that the trial judge had intervened in the questioning
of witnesses so as to favor the prosecution; unfortunately, theexamples Frank reproduced in a footnote to his opinion have been
omitted from this book. The Rosenbergs also asserted, again with
reason, that the repeated references during the trial to their radical political beliefs and membership in the Communist party,
even if arguably relevant, unduly prejudiced their right to an
impartial trial {pp. 294-97). Both claims, however, ran counter
to Frank's views on the fact-finding process~ He felt that judges
were considerably better fact-finders than jurors, and thus he was
not averse to their intervening at trial (pp. 238-39). He also had

12. See also the discussion of two other Frank opinions in M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S
299-301 (1970).
.
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a strong predilection in favor of admitting all relevant evidence
for appraisal by the fact-finder (p. 393). Yet as I have pointed out
before, in other cases his concern for fair treatment of criminal
defendants overrode these views. 13
What seems clearly anomalous is Frank's repeated reliance
on the trial judge's admonitions to the jury as a prophylactic for
whatever dangers of unfairness lurked in these and other claims.
At every other place in this volume in which Frank referred to
judicial admonitions, he ridiculed them as useless and even
harmful (pp. 333, 347, 350). To be sure, he acknowledged his
usual view at one point in the Rosenberg opinion, but his only
response was that the Rosenbergs had "made no effort to procure a trial by a judge alone" (p. 297). It is impossible to reconcile this harsh remark with Frank's repeated invocation in other
contexts of the constitutional right to a jury trial. 14
Turning to the death penalty, the crux of the Rosenbergs'
position, even supposing they were guilty as charged, was that by
far the most important of the secrets they stole were passed to a
wartime ally, hardly a hanging crime. In legal terms this translated into a contention that the sentence was either an abuse of
the trial judge's discretion or unconstitutional. In researching
these claims, Frank discovered a third argument, unfortunately
omitted from the opinion as reproduced in this volume, that
under the circumstances the death penalty was not authorized by
statute. The death penalty could only be given for espionage during wartime; otherwise the maximum sentence was twenty years
in prison. In terms of policy, the statutory argument was that
Congress, in hiking the maximum punishment so drastically for
wartime espionage, must have been thinking of passing secrets to
enemies, not allies. Admittedly, there were tenable objections to
this argument. The rest of the statute had already been held to
apply to spying for friends as well as enemies, and the absence of
an explicit distinction in the death penalty provision might point
in the same direction. As a matter of policy, too, Congress might
have felt that even disclosures to allies had to be deterred drastically in wai:time because of the danger of security leaks. My only
13. See al~o United States v. Giallo, 206 F.2d 207, 211-13 (2d Cir. 1953) (dissenting
opinion).
14. Frank also repeatedly relied on the competence and conscientiousness of defense
counsel and on statements by them at trial that the defendants had been treated fairly
(pp. 294-95, 298, 304). These references display an insensitivity, extraordinary in Fronk,
to the manifold difficulties-logistic anti tactical-confronting defense counsel in this
case. See L. NlZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY (1973).
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point here is that the statutory argument against the death penalty was very strong, an assessment shared by three astute faculty
colleagues to whom I have put the problem. Yet Frank's entire
response to the argument was, "[T]he legislative history contains nothing to support such an interpretation. " 15 I conclude that
although Frank may have opposed the death penalty in general,
and may even have objected to it in this particular case, he did
not search zealously for grounds on which he might overturn it
as he did other criminal convictions that aroused his sense of
injustice. 16
If I am right that Frank behaved differently in the Rosenberg
case, and perhaps in his other cases involving communism, readers may wonder why. His long-time colleague and adversary,
Judge Clark, wrote privately of Frank's "troublesome lack of
forthrightness in the political or so-called 'Communist' cases"; 17
by this I take him to have meant a lack of courage. The biographer of Learned Hand's Court, Marvin Schick, speculated that
Frank had acquired a strong anti-Communist bias from his personal experience with aides in the New Deal. 18 As an ardent admirer of Judge Learned Hand, Frank may have absorbed some of
his mentor's judicial modesty in the face of a political storm as
strong as McCarthyism. These are mere conjectures, however; we
will not approach certainty without information of a more private
character than has yet been published.
In any event, Frank was sensitive to suggestions that he had
let down the liberal side in the "big" cases of the early 1950s.
Readers will find his feelings fully expressed in the speech entitled, "On Holding Abe Lincoln's Hat," but they also surfaced in
at least one case here. Reviewing a felony murder conviction in
1955 he wrote,
Recently many outstanding Americans have been much concerned-and justifiably-with inroads on the constitutional privileges of persons questioned about subversive activities. But concern with such problems, usually those of fairly prominent persons,
should not blind one to the less dramatic, less publicized plight of
humble, inconspicuous men . . . when unconstitutionally victimized by officialdom. It will not do to say-as some do-that deep
15. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 603 n.21 (2d Cir. 1952).
16. Frank did not rely on the fact that the Rosenbergs had failed to raise the statutory
point. To have done so would have been inconsistent with his approach in other cases (e.g.,
p. 319).
17. Letter from Judge Clark to Edmond Cahn (Feb. 25, 1958), reprinted in M. SCHICK,
supra note 12, at 299.
18. M. SCHICK, supra note 12, at 301-03.
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concern with such problems of the humble is the mark of an "oldfashioned liberal." For repeated and unredressed attacks on the
constitutional liberties of the humble will tend to destroy the foundations supporting the constitutional liberties of everyone. The
test of the moral quality of a civilization is its treatment of the
weak and powerless. [P. 374]

Some potential readers of this volume may be consoled by
the proposition that Frank was not as iconoclastic, or as liberal,
as he appears. Another trait that close examination of this book
reveals will hardly appeal to anyone. Frank had an unfortunate
penchant for gross overargument, manifested in a variety of ways.
He frequently resorted to exaggeration. He made glaringly fallacious and even absurd contentions. He often failed to grant serious difficulties in his own position. In some cases Frank's entire
line of argument was hung from such devices.
At the risk of tedium, I will try to provide enough clear-cut
examples at least to establish that I am not being unfair to Frank.
One fertile source is United States u. Roth, otherwise an admirable opinion:
(1) Frank claimed "it seems doubtful" that the first
amendment was meant by the framers to leave room for an obscenity statute. His entire evidence is that Franklin, "father of
the Post Office," wrote two ribald works; that Jefferson extolled
Franklin and wrote approvingly of one of those works; that Madison also admired Franklin and himself told Rabelaisian anecdotes; and that Madison, with Jefferson's encouragement, introduced what became the first amendment (pp. 117-18).
(2) Frank argued that if the obscenity statute was valid on
its face, it must logically be applied to press accounts of sexual
crimes (pp. 128-29). He declined even to consider the possibility
of doctrinal developments that would fairly distinguish such material from hard-core pornography.1 9
(3) To his credit, Frank raised the difficult and important
question, often ignored, whether "artistic" speech was protected
by the first amendment. His affirmative response, however,
rested solely on an ambiguous sentence from the 1774 address of
the Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec, plus assorted warnings about the impact of censorship on innovative art
(pp. 136-37).
(4) Frank claimed that the obscenity statute was void for
vagueness because even judges could not agree on its meaning.
19. Compare, for example, Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
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His sole ground for saying so was that a part of the definition of
obscenity-whose lust had to be aroused-had once changed {pp.
138-39).
Another fertile source of examples of Frank's propensity for
overargument is the harmless error cases, particularly United
States v. Rubenstein and United States v. Antonelli Fireworks
Co.:
(1) In only one of the four cases did the majority find error
at trial; in the others it had no occasion to apply a harmless error
test. Therefore, Frank was attacking the majority for failing to
justify something it had not done. This is most evident in
Rubenstein, in which Frank accused Judge Learned Hand of virtual double-talk as to the ground of his decision {p. 320).
· (2) Frank repeatedly claimed that the majority's test of
harmless error was whether it personally believed the defendant
to be guilty (e.g., pp. 320, 328-29). Yet the express position of the
majority in genuine harmless error cases was much more complex, involving both the weight of the evidence against the defendant and the seriousriess of the error; the resulting test was considerably stricter than Frank suggested. 20 Nor did Frank come
near showing that what the majority did was different from what
it said, and at least in the case of Judge Learned Hand, an intensely honest and self-aware judge, the proposition would have
been inherently implausible.
(3) Coupled with the last point was Frank's contention in
Antonelli Fireworks that unless the court treated all errors as
harmful or adopted his slightly less drastic test-was the evidence "so 'strong' that no sensible jury, had there been no error,
would conceivably have acquitted, as for instance where the defendant in his testimony in effect admits his guilt" -the court
was "[n]ecessarily" deciding merely according to its own view
of the defendant's guilt {p. 328). This simplistic analysis omitted
a large middle ground, one piece of which had been staked out
by the majority.
(4) Especially in Antonelli Fireworks Frank insisted that
the Supreme Court had adopted his test of harmless error. The
evidence he adduced at most showed only that the Court had
rejected the extreme alternative of deciding merely according to
its own view of guilt or innocence (pp. 331-32).
Finally, here are a half-dozen examples, by no means exhaus20. See cases reproduced or noted in THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING: THE DECISIONS
253-63 (H. Shanks ed. 1968).
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tive, from other cases:
(1) Baseball's reserve clause forbids players to play on any
professional team other than the one with which they first contracted, except when the right to hire them was transferred to
another team. In Gardella v. Chandler, Frank foolishly described
this arrangement as "shockingly repugnant to moral principles
that, at least since the War Between the States, have been basic
in America . . . virtual slavery" {p. 312).
(2) In United States v. Leviton, defense counsel objected to
the introduction of part of a codefendant's confession but did not
make it clear whether he wanted it excluded altogether or merely
sought a cautionary instruction. The trial judge understood the
latter, sustained the objection, and promised to give an appropriate instruction. Defense counsel never claimed until the appeal
that he had been misunderstood. 21 Yet without acknowledging the
slightest uncertainty, Frank asserted that counsel had asked for
exclusion of the passage altogether {p. 347).
(3) In United States v. On Lee, an informer entered the
shop of a drug suspect and had an incriminating conversation
with him. µistead of merely reporting what was said to a policeman afterward, the informer broadcast the conversation to the
policeman by means of a hidden radio. In dissent, Frank equated
these facts to George Orwell's description in 1984 of the telescreen
compulsorily installed in every house. He absurdly concluded,
"My colleagues' decision, by legitimizing the use of such a future
horror, invites it" (pp. 359-60).
(4) In United States v. St. Pierre, Frank relied very heavily
on a state court decision concerning the privilege against selfincrimination (p. 387). The majority, through Judge Learned
Hand, had made it clear that the decision was unique and contradicted by those of numerous other courts, yet Frank never alluded
to this fact in his dissent.
(5) In the same case, Frank made the tenable suggestion
that relatively specific constitutional clauses ought to be given a
more rigorous interpretation. On this ground he argued, plausibly
enough, for strict enforcement of the privilege against selfincrimination. Yet as a former New Dealer he could not resist
characterizing the equally specific obligation-of-contracts clause
as a relatively vague provision that should be applied leniently
(pp. 392-93).
21. United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 864 n.10 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion).
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(6) In Keller v. Brooklyn Bus Corp., the trial judge first
gave a blurred but arguably inaccurate instruction on the burden
of proof for contributory negligence and later adopted a clear and
accurate statement of the same matter. On appeal the majority·
mentioned that the correct statement came at the end of the trial
judge's charge. Frank astutely responded, "But what justification
is there for believing that the last words in a speech are invariably
the ones most heeded by the audience?" (p. 417). Yet in Antonelli
Fireworks, with the shoe on the other foot, he accused the prosecutor of "bearing in mind an ancient observation, 'If you want to
excite prejudice you must do so at the close, so that the jurors
may more easily remember what you said' " (p. 326).
I do not, myself, mean to exaggerate. I have already mentioned that this volume repeatedly exhibits Frank's mastery of
traditional legal skills. The reader can also find demonstrations
of balance and candor. For example, Frank qualified in major
ways the extreme views on obscenity of his ally, Judge Curtis Bok
(p. 138); he recited important psychological objections to the special verdict (p. 269); his discussion of judicial bias in In re J.P.
Linahan, Inc., was remarkably sensitive; he expressly conceded
at least a limited value to general rules of law and stare decisis
(pp. 444, 446). Indeed, some of the opinions in this volume were
argued solidly pretty much from start to finish. Of the individual
opinions I especially recommend United States ex rel. Leyra v.
Denno and United States v. Field.
It is also true that many of Frank's excesses would probably
pass unnoticed by the ordinary reader, and at least to this extent
they were not harmful. Yet there were some who noted them and
were greatly offended. The most significant was a colleague,
Judge Clark, who privately complained about Frank's "tendency
to ascribe fairly unconscionable positions to his colleagues against
their openly stated views, preparatory to the demolition of the
straw men thus created." 22
,
The simplest explanation of Frank's penchant for overargument is excessive zeal for his social goals-fair play for criminal
defendants and the like. Yet the two friends who wrote the introduction and preface to this volume portray Frank, not as an
extremist, but as a person who kept his commitments in perspective. This is also the way Frank viewed himself. He wrote,

I have no respect for the humorless self-righteous sort of person
who has a firm conviction that always he alone, of the entire regi22. Quoted in M. ScmcK, supra note 12, at 276.
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ment, is in step. Accordingly, when all my colleagues (whom I
consider among the ablest of judges) repeatedly arrive at a certain
conclusion, my sense of humor usually downs my doubts and
nudges me into acquiescence. [P. 325]

Another of his friends' characterizations of Frank may bring
us closer to the explanation. Both stress his love of advocacy,
reflected in his penchant for "using every available proof and
argument" (p. x), his "knack of reducing complicated records to
simple terms" (p. xix). I sense that this love of advocacy was
generally joined much more closely to ebullient playfulness and
a desire to shine than to hostility toward adversaries. In any
event, I suggest that when Frank sat down to draft an opinion on
a controversial subject, he was seized with an impulse to overwhelm the opposition, and driven by this impulse he lost his selfrestraint.
More will be known about such matters when private sources
of information are made public. Marvin Schick, who had access
to some of these sources, recounts an important incident that
tends to support my view. In United States u. Sacher, 23 the contempt proceeding against defense counsel arising out of the Smith
Act prosecution of the top Communist leaders, Frank wrote a
concurring opinion, upholding the convictions, that displayed his
usual excesses. Yet as Schick reveals, Frank's first inclination was
to overturn the convictions; he apparently had to be talked
around by Judge Augustus Hand. Moreover, the first published
version of his concurring opinion was relatively mild; he used the
occasion of a petition for rehearing to stiffen it considerably. 24 My
impression is that the excesses of the final version were a product,
not of Frank's deep-seated commitment to the outcome, but of
psychic steam generated by the process of espousing his viewpoint. The fact that his perennial adversary, Judge Clark, was on
the other side added to the pleasure of combat.
Yet readers should not judge Frank's balance and candor
wholly by these writings. The introduction and preface to the
volume testify that in person he was affectionate, lovable, and
sympathetic, never rancorous, able to laugh at himself, accept
criticism, and admit his own errors. Justice Frankfurter made
this point explicitly. "To have known Jerome Frank only through
his writings was not to have known him. On paper he appeared
prickly and pugilistic; in personal relations he was warm-hearted
23. 182 F.2d 416, 453-63 (2d Cir. 1950) (concurring opinion).
24. M. SCHICK, supra note 12, at 291-96.
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and generous. " 25
Professor Llewellyn, a long-time colleague and partial adversary of Frank, wrote of him after his death, "[A]lmost great. " 26
I find that a just judgment, and ample reason for readers to
consult this book.
25. OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER TmNas THAT MATTER 100 (P. Kurland ed. 1969).
26. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 10, at 220 n.214.

